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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs . 
WADE WAGSTAFF, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 920142-CA 
Category No. 
Brief of Appellant 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(e and f), as the appeal is from an 
interlocutory order of the First District Court in a criminal case. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appeal is taken from the order of the First District Court, 
Cache County, entered pursuant to Memoranda Decision dated February 
26, 1992. (Attached as Addendum 1, hereto) 
Appellant's Petition for Permission to Appeal from an Inter-
locutory Order pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which was submitted to this Court on March 9, 1992, was 
granted by Order of this Court on March 27, 1992. 
This appeal is from the final order of the First District 
Court, the Honorable Gordon Low presiding, denying Defendant-
Appellant's Motion to Suppress illegally obtained evidence. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Can an item which is illegally obtained in violation of an 
individual's constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution be the subject and basis for the second 
degree felony of tampering with evidence under Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 76-8-510(1). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAV? 
Determinative statutes in this matter are the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and Section 76-8-510(1) of 
the Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant was the invited guest in a home which was 
the subject of an illegal search. As enumerated by the hearing 
judge, the surveillance prior to warrant, the warrant itself, the 
time of entry, the actual entry, the search of Defendant/Appellant 
and the taking of the property were stipulated to be illegal for 
purposes of the Motion to Suppress (Transcript [hereinafter T] page 
thereinafter p] 16, Line [hereinafter L] 8-17; T, p.18, L.18-23; 
T, p.23, L.6-8.) Counsel for the State was ordered, pursuant to 
the court's Memorandum Decision, to prepare an order in conformance 
with the Memorandum Decision. The State in its proposed order 
(attached hereto as Addendum 2) adopted the language of the 
Memorandum Decision which stated in relevant part: "The State was 
willing for purposes of this Motion only, to stipulate that the 
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presence of the officers and the seizure of the property from the 
Defendant was unlawful." The trial court held that the unlawful 
conduct did not vitiate the prosecution of the charge of tampering 
with evidence, though the evidence was the subject of the illegal 
seizure. In the suppression hearing the State claimed that "there 
isn't any requirement under the law that evidence be seized legally 
or lawfully." (T, p.6, L.16-17). The hearing court denied 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant/Appellant 
filed Petition to appeal the interlocutory order, which this Court 
granted. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of appellate review which is applicable herein, 
as stated in State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1990), is 
a "correction of error standard" all relevant facts having been 
stipulated by the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By stipulation and adoption of the Memorandum Decision of the 
Court Order, the State radically reduced the factual basis which 
this Court must concern itself. Defendant/Appellant's obligations 
to marshall the facts pursuant to State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 
(Utah App. 1990) therefore has been distilled to a brief 
recitation. The relevant facts before the Court on the narrow 
issue presented are: 
1. Defendant/Appellant was the subject of an illegal search 
of his person and seizure of his person and property by Logan City 
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Police officers (See Memorandum Decision, p.l; T, p.16, L.8-17; T, 
p.18, L.18-23; T, p.23, L.6-8). 
2. The police illegally seized "something" from the 
Defendant/Appellant and placed it on a table (See Memorandum 
Decision, p.l; T, p.20, L.17-19; T, p.21, L.7-10) 
3. Defendant/Appellant re-acquired the item which had been 
taken from him and did something with it. (See Memorandum 
Decision, p. 1; T, p.20, L.17-19; T, p.20, L. 7-10.) 
A full statement of facts is proffered to aid the court in 
understanding the circumstances surrounding the stipulated facts. 
1. On or about 12 September, 1991 elements of the Logan City 
Police Department were conducting a surveillance operation, without 
prior court authorization or warrant, within the confines of Logan 
City for unknown purposes. 
2. The above-mentioned elements employed an electronic 
devise referred to in the affidavit for search warrant as a 
"portable phone scanner." 
3. The above-referenced elements knowingly and intentionally 
intercepted private telephonic communication between two un-
identified individuals who were unaware of the interception of the 
private communication. 
4. The above-referenced elements evidently tape recorded a 
telephonic communication. 
5. Based upon what is referred to in the Affidavit for 
Search Warrant as "interception" of the telephonic communication 
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the above-referenced elements requested a warrant to search a 
private residence. 
6. The Affidavit requested a warrant to be issued for search 
of a specific residence with no acceptable justification. 
7. The Affidavit further requested the warrant be allowed 
to be executed in a no-knock fashion with no acceptable justifica-
tion. 
8. The Affidavit further requested the warrant be served in 
the nighttime with no acceptable justification. 
9. The Affidavit further requested the search of specified 
and unspecified persons at the residence with no acceptable 
justification. 
10. The Affidavit purported to identify the house to be 
searched by statements by one of the parties concerning his 
anticipation of purchasing another house. 
11. No other identification was offered in the Affidavit of 
either of the parties to the illegally intercepted telephonic 
communication. 
12. The Affidavit assumed that a Robert Evans was one of the 
parties to the illegally intercepted telephonic communication. 
13. The Affidavit prepared by the above-referenced indivi-
duals stated assumptions which were unfounded in fact. 
14. Based upon the above-mentioned Affidavit, Circuit Court 
Judge Judkins issued a warrant for search. 
15. The Warrant was authorized for immediate search day or 
night. 
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16. The warrant was authorized to be served without notice 
to the residence located at 1036 South Park Avenue or 1063 Park 
Avenue on all persons in the home. 
17. On or about 13 September, 1991 at 20:45 hours, elements 
of the Logan City Police Department served without notice a Search 
Warrant at 2063 South Park Ave., Logan, Utah upon all persons 
therein. 
18. At no time during the search were the elements of the 
Logan City Police Department threatened by force or weapons. 
19. All persons at the residence were forced in a single room 
where they were restrained. 
20. Defendant/Appellant who was an invited guest of the 
residents of the dwelling was handcuffed and segregated from the 
other persons and taken to the kitchen area. 
21. Police officers searched the Defendant/Appellant by 
removing items from his pockets. 
22. The officers executing the search warrant thereafter 
questioned Defendant/Appellant if "he had anything else." 
23. The police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
believe Defendant/Appellant was armed with any weapon. 
24. Thereafter Defendant/Appellant was subjected to a second 
search of his pants pockets. 
25. The above-referenced elements removed a small plastic bag 
from Defendant/Appellant's front pants pockets and placed it on a 
table. 
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26. The above-referenced elements thereafter unhandcuffed 
Defendant/Appellant. 
27. Allegedly, Defendant/Appellant thereafter took the 
plastic bag from the table and attempted to tamper with it. 
28. Defendant/Appellant was thereafter physically brutalized 
by the above-referenced elements and subjected to a third "body 
cavity" search. 
29. Defendant/Appellant was thereafter formally arrested. 
30. Defendant/Appellant has been charged with the second 
degree felony of tampering with evidence. 
The State, for purposes of the Motion to Suppress, stipulated 
that the officers' presence in the house and the search of the 
Defendant/Appellant was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution and was therefore illegal. 
The District court in its Memorandum Decision determined that 
thorough the search of the residence and the seizure and search of 
the Defendant/Appellant was illegal that property so obtained might 
still be the subject of, and basis for the charge of evidence 
tampering and denied Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Suppress. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The illegally obtained evidence in question could not be 
used in a proceeding or investigation. 
2. The state cannot claim jurisdiction over illegally 
obtained evidence. 
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3. Under the circumstances in this case, the charge of 
tampering with evidence under U.C.A. 76-8-510(1) cannot be based 
upon the fruit of the poisonous tree. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN QUESTION 
CANNOT BE USED IN A PROCEEDING OR INVESTIGATION 
Defendant/Appellant was originally charged with three criminal 
counts: (1) tampering with evidence; (2) unlawful possession of 
controlled substance; and (3) interference with an arresting 
officer. Based upon the suppression motion hearing, the state 
acquiesced the impact of the illegal search and seizure as being 
fatal to both the possession and interference charges by dismissing 
with prejudice counts 2 and 3. (T, p.18, L.18-22) (attached hereto 
as Addendum 3). It is unclear from the record why both possession 
and interference would be tainted by the illegal conduct while 
tampering would not. The charge of interference being more closely 
analogous to an independent act (such as assault on a police 
officer) than tampering., An illegality fatal to interference must 
also be fatal to the charge of tampering with evidence. This 
appeal is concerned only with Count 1, tampering with evidence in 
violation of U.C.A. 76-8-510(1). In relevant part the statute 
states: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree 
if, believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be insti-
tuted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals or 
removes anything with a purpose to 
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impair its verity or availability in 
the proceeding or investigation. 
The language of the statute which is most significant to this case 
is "to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation." The subject of the statute entitled "tampering 
with evidence" is an object the language of the text refers to as 
"anything." That term, used in the text as it is, must be 
construed as "anything which might be used by the state as 
evidence," or the statute would be inherently overbroad and there-
fore in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and unconstitutional on its face. For instance, if a 
person took and hid a chair in which the police wished to sit an 
accused for interrogation, that person would have concealed some-
thing [anything] and impaired its use in the investigation. The 
chair was certainly not evidence and the person certainly would 
not be in violation of U.C.A. 76-8-510. 
The "anything" (hereinafter referred to as Evidence) which is 
the subject of this case was stipulated to be an item which was 
taken from Defendant/Appellant's pocket and placed on a table (See 
Memorandum Decision, p.l; T, p.20, L.16-19). The Evidence was 
obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure (See Memorandum 
Decision, p.l; T, p.16, L.8-17; T, p.18, L.18-23; T, p.23, L.6-8). 
The obvious question is: Based upon the foregoing analysis 
what legitimate purpose could the state possibly use the illegally 
obtained evidence for, in a proceeding or investigation? 
9 
Defendant/Appellant would suggest that no legitimate use can 
be made of Evidence the law requires excluded. The hearing court 
recognized that status of the Evidence by stating: 
THE COURT: I don't thing there's any question that 
the whatever was on the table was the fruit of the 
poisonous tree given the stipulation by the State. (T, 
p.23, L.23-25) 
Utah law is clear as to the disposition of evidence so ob-
tained. Illegally obtained evidence must be excluded. The Supreme 
Court of Utah in State v. Thompson, 810 P. 2d 415 (Utah 1991) 
stated: 
[Ejxclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a 
necessary consequence of police violations of article I, 
section 14. 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472 (Utah 1990); see also State v. 
Bolt, 142, Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519, 524 (1984). 
The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991) clearly enunciated the relevant law of exclusion. The 
Court in Ramirez, supra, stated: 
If a seizure occurs and the police are unable to 
point to the specific and articulable facts that 
justified that seizure, the seizure violates the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitution, and evidence 
obtained as a result of the illegal seizure must be 
excluded. Terry, 392 U.S. at 15. The exclusionary rule 
applies not only to evidence obtained directly as a 
result of the illegal seizure, but also to evidence 
obtained by exploitation of the illegality, unless the 
evidence was obtained by means "sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting 
Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1956); Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
at 690 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). 
The Court in commenting on the scope of its discussion stated: 
The parties have not argued for a separate analysis 
under article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and 
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therefore, we address the issue only under the federal 
constitution. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 
n. 2 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988); 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-07 (Utah 1986). 
However, that is not to suggest that a separate state 
constitutional analysis might not be appropriate. See 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469-71 (Utah 1990). 
The Court in Ramirez discussed the failure of the trial judge to 
suppress illegally obtained evidence stating: 
.this is a situation where the trial judge 
permitted the evidence of the stop and seizure and the 
fruits of the stop, including the eyewitness identi-
fication into evidence without determining its consti-
tutional admissibility. This was error. (Emphasis 
added). 
Defendant/Appellant has claimed the protection of Article 1, 
Section 14 of Utah's Constitution as well as the Federal Consti-
tutional provisions discussed by the Court in Ramirez, supra. 
If the Evidence which was seized has no other use in the 
proceeding or investigation but to incriminate the Defendant/ 
Appellant, and it must be excluded, Evidence so obtained cannot be 
the critical element of the charge of "tampering with evidence" 
under U.C.A. 76-8-510(1). 
Point II 
JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the 
jurisdiction of the State to maintain an action involving illegally 
obtained property. In Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991) 
the Court stated: 
[6] We now turn to the effect that the invalid 
seizure had on the forfeiture proceeding. Utah Liquor 
Commission v. Wooras, 97 Utah 351, 364 93 P.2d 455, 461 
(1939), held that "before a court can lawfully determine 
any rights it must not only be a court empowered by law 
to determine such rights, but it must have acquired 
jurisdiction or control over the subject of the parti-
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cular action." In forfeiture actions, "where the pro-
ceeding is essentially against the property as such, the 
res itself must be brought before the court by and 
through such process as the law has decreed to place it 
within the power and control of the court. . . . And 
where there is no jurisdiction acquired the judgment is 
void." 97 Utah at 364-65, 93 P.2d at 461-62 (citations 
omitted). 
The Court in Wooras, supra, stated the question of juris-
diction as: 
Seizure of the property is necessary to give juris-
diction over it. Lutz v. Kelly, 47 Iowa 307, 309; Drake 
on Attach., sec. 436, 437; Darrance v. Preston, 18 Iowa 
396. 
Since the power of authority of the court to proceed 
is predicated upon a seizure which brings the property 
within the possession and control of the court, it 
follows as of course that such control and possession of 
the court must be a lawful one. A lawful possession of 
the property of another cannot be predicated or based 
upon an unlawful taking or acquiring of such possession. 
The seizure in this case being wrongful and unlawful, the 
court would have no jurisdiction to forfeit or confiscate 
the property, because the property was not m its lawful 
possession and control, so as to be subject to its orders 
and judgments of forfeiture. 
Defendant/Appellant concedes that both Davis and Wooras, 
supra, deal with forfeiture cases in which the state wrongfully 
seized property of citizens and attempted to permanently deprive 
the citizens of that property. These forfeiture cases are 
analogous to this case because the basic question of jurisdiction 
is always relevant. Tampering with evidence is essentially a 
charge which alleges conduct amounting to depriving the government 
of "something" which it could use in a proceeding or investigation.. 
If the government has illegally obtained that "something," it would 
not have grounds to complain of any act against it because of the 
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nature of its possession of the item. The government by wrongfully 
obtaining the item has no lawful jurisdiction over it. For the 
state to claim an item has achieved the status of "evidence1 for 
purposes of U.C.A. 76-8-510(1) the Court must first find the State 
was lawfully in possession of that thing prior to exercising 
jurisdiction over it before allowing the State to use it in an 
"investigation or proceeding." Based on the foregoing analysis, 
it stands to reason that the State does not have jurisdiction to 
prosecute this matter. The prosecution's claim that "there isn't 
any requirement under the law that evidence be seized legally or 
lawfully" (T, p.6, L.16-17) is totally incorrect. 
Point III 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE, THE CHARGE OF 
TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE UNDER U.C.A 76-8-510(1) 
CANNOT BE BASED UPON THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE 
Defendant/Appellant concedes that in a different factual 
scenario, theoretically something which was illegally seized from 
one person (Party A) might be used as evidence against another 
person (Party B) who did not have standing to complain of the 
unconstitutional act. Under that factual scenario if Party A did 
something to the item which could be used as legitimate evidence 
against Party B, then tampering might arguably be an appropriate 
charge, the taint of the original illegal act being purged as it 
concerned Party B. The case at hand does not lend itself to that 
scenario, the "something" involved only having connection and 
relevance to Defendant/Appellant, the subject of the illegal search 
and seizure. 
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Other jurisdictions have considered the issue of the impact 
of illegal police conduct in search and seizure scenarios as it 
impacts the charge of "tampering with evidence." In the case of 
Jones v. State, 681 P.2d 364 (Al. App. 1984) the Court of Appeals 
of Alaska considered the issue of a defective warrant on the charge 
of evidence tampering under AS 11.56.610 (attached hereto as 
Addendum 4), a statute similar to U.C.A. 76-8-510. The court 
stated the case as: 
Casey Jones was convicted of possession of cocaine, 
AS 17.10.010, and tampering with physical evidence, 
AS 11.56.610.a(4). He appeals, contending that the 
evidence against him was obtained by an illegal 
search and seizure in violation of his rights under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and comparable provisions of our state 
constitution. He reasons that the search was 
pursuant to a warrant which was not based upon a 
sufficient showing of probable cause. We agree and 
reverse. 
In Jones, supra, the Court concluded: 
In summary, the magistrate simply did not have 
sufficient information in the affidavit to make a 
reasoned decision regarding issuance of the search 
warrant. Consequently, the warrant was improperly issued 
and the fruits of the search must be suppressed. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska in State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 
(Alaska 1985) on appeal thoroughly considered the validity of the 
search warrant. After determining the warrant was invalid and the 
search illegal the Court simply concluded, 
In this case, the magistrate did not have sufficient 
information in the affidavit to make a reasoned decision 
to issue the search warrant. Consequently, the warrant 
was improperly issued and the fruits of the search must 
be suppressed. 
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The decision of the court of appeals reversing the 
superior court is hereby AFFIRMED on the basis of the 
Alaska Constitution. 
The issue in both State v. Jones, supra, decisions was the 
issue of the search and seizure. Once decided on search and 
seizure the Court's directive in State v. Jones, supra, was 
automatic suppression. 
In Sites v. Florida, 582 So.2d 813 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1991) 
a Florida Court of Appeals considered the application of FCA 918.13 
(attached hereto as Addendum 5) a statute similar to U.C.A.76-8-
510 a factual scenario similar to the case at hand. In Sites, the 
case was stated by the Court as: 
.an appeal from the denial of a motion to 
suppress and a judgment and sentence. We reverse and 
remand. 
The court reviewed the following facts: 
Appellant was asleep in his car, which was lawfully 
parked along a road near a bridge about 10:00 or 11:00 
p.m. OFficer Touchberry, having been with the Vero Beach 
Police Department for a year and a half, noticed the car 
and thought it was fire-gutted. When he approached the 
car, he realized it was not, but rather tape around the 
rear window gave it that appearance. He was curious 
about the car being parked there, so he approached the 
car, saw the appellant asleep across the two front bucket 
seats and woke him up. 
Appellant sat up at the officer's request and begun 
to look for his wallet to produce identification, again 
at the officer's request. The officer saw in appellant's 
front t-shirt pocket a package of Winston cigarettes and 
a pack of Zig-Zag rolling papers. The officer's 
experience was that such papers were used more commonly 
for marijuana than regular tobacco. The car did not 
smell of marijuana. 
The officer asked appellant to empty the contents 
of his pockets on the hood of the car. Appellant reached 
in his pockets and fumbled and then pulled out was the 
officer thought appeared to be a marijuana cigarette. 
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Appellant put the cigarette into his mouth and the 
officer attempted to retrieve it. The officer grabbed 
appellant's neck and his hands. Appellant swallowed the 
cigarette. 
The Court in reviewing the case history stated: 
Appellant was charged by information with tampering 
with evidence, resisting an officer without violence and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. The state nolle 
prossed the resisting count. Appellant moved to suppress 
the evidence as resulting from an unlawful 
search/seizure, which motion the trial court denied after 
a hearing. A jury found appellant not guilty of 
possession of drug paraphernalia and guilty of tampering 
with evidence as charged. He was adjudicated guilty and 
sentenced to twenty-two months incarceration. His appeal 
of the order denying his motion to suppress and his 
appeal of his judgment and sentence were consolidated by 
this court. 
The Court ruled that: 
Nothing in the circumstances of appellant sleeping 
in his legally parked car suggested any illegal activity 
was taking place. Legally parked cars do not give police 
officers a basis for detaining or searching persons 
therein. 
As referenced above, the Court in Sites, supra, reversed the 
conviction for tampering with evidence based upon the illegal acts 
of the police. As in the Jones case, supra, the Court, after 
making the determination that the relevant constitutional 
provisions were violated automatically reversed the lower courts 
refusal to suppress the illegally obtained evidence and set aside 
the conviction of Sites and Jones for tampering with evidence. In 
the case now before the Court, the State has saved the Court the 
trouble of analyzing the search and seizure issue by stipulation. 
Evidence which is illegally obtained by police in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
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and Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution cannot be the 
basis for charges under U.C.A. 76-8-501(1) unless the evidence 
would be independently admissible, or as stated in Ramirez, supra, 
quoting Wongsun, "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the 
primary taint." 
The facts in this case illustrate that the only person against 
which the Evidence could be used was Defendant/Appellant. Because 
it was stipulated the Defendant/Appellant's state and federal 
constitutional rights were violated, the Evidence cannot be purged 
of the taint of unconstitutional conduct and consequently cannot 
be used. The lower court's failure to suppress the evidence and 
to dismiss the charge of tampering with evidence was error and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecutor defined the issue of the case as succinctly as 
possible in saying "there isn't any requirement under the law that 
evidence be seized legally or lawfully" (T, p.6, L.16-17). 
Luckily for the citizens of Utah, the great weight of decisions 
from this Court, the Utah Supreme Court and other jurisdictions on 
the subject of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence directly 
contradict the prosecutors analysis. Because the object in 
question was illegally obtained no jurisdiction exists over it and 
it may not be used in an investigation or proceeding. U.C.A. 76-
8-510(1) cannot be charged against Defendant/Appellant in this 
factual scenario. To be relevant in a criminal proceeding or 
investigation under this factual scenario in this case, the 
17 
evidence would have to be obtained in a manner which would be 
admissible. The lower court erred in refusing to exclude by 
suppression evidence it recognized as being fruit of the poisonous 
tree (T, p.23, L.23-25). Because the exclusionary rule prohibits 
the introduction of evidence which is illegally obtained, the 
charges against Defendant/Appellant must be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this ^O^ day of June, 1992. 
EDWIN T. PETERSON, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid to 
Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, David B. Thompson, Appeals 
Division, 236 State Capital Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
on this ^Qrk day of June, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff ; 
vs. ] 
WADE D. WAGSTAFF, ] 
Defendant ] 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i CASE NO. 911000106 
THIS MATTER IS before the Court upon a Motion to Suppress, 
Without reviewing all of the dialogue which occurred on the 
record on the 20th day of February, 1992, this case presents 
somewhat of a Catch 22 dilemma in that the State was willing, 
for purposes of this Motion only, to stipulate that the 
presence of the officers and the seizure of property from the 
Defendant was unlawful. 
The question which then remains is whether that vitiates 
the prosecution of the change of tampering with evidence by the 
Defendant. The facts before the Court, as it pertains to this 
issue, are that the officer's had seized something from the 
Defendant, placed it upon the table, after which the Defendant 
grabbed it and somehow tampered with it, either by eating it or 
otherwise concealing it. 
The Defense's basic position is that evidence of that act 
by the Defendant and the item which he tampered with cannot be 
used because it is evidence obtained at the scene, all of which 
is the fruit of an unlawful police action. 
An analogy was made at the hearing as to whether the same 
argument could be made that if during this (unlawful) search or 
arrest/ the Defendant had assaulted a police officer. Could 
MICRO FfLMFbD 
DATS: ^.^Ll^li^IjA 
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then the evidence of that assault likewise be precluded because 
whatever was observed would be inadmissible, again being a 
result of an illegal entry or presence by police officer. 
The issue may turn on the definition of evidence. Evidence 
to be admitted into the trial is in fact not evidence until it 
is received. On the other hand evidence under Section 
76-8-510, U.C.A., is actually defined as "anything" which may 
be used in a proceeding or investigation. The Defense would 
have the court suppress "anything", any action, observation, or 
item, as "evidence" which came about, which was creatively used 
or involved in a criminal investigation which was unlawful. 
That interpretation would then give license to anyone involved 
in an arrest, seizure, confinement or otherwise believing it to 
be unlawful to commit any crime he or she desired to on the 
basis that evidence of such a crime could not be later used. 
If a person were falsely arrested and placed in incarceration, 
then under this theory he or she could destroy the jail, 
assault inmates, or commit other crimes, and evidence of that 
could not be used because all of the evidence thereof would be 
obtained during his or her unlawful confinement. 
The reasonable conclusion can only be that the Fourth 
Amendment application cannot be used to suppress evidence of 
the witness tampering charge. The Motion as to that charge 
then is denied. The balance of the Motion may still be 
addressable as to Counts 2 and 3, but the State has indicated 
that it would likely dismiss those charges therefore obviate 
the need to continue with the Motion and a hearing relative 
thereto. 
Counsel for the State is direct to prepare a formal Order 
in conformance herewith. 
State vs. Wagstaff 
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Dated this 26th day of February, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the forgoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid, to the 
attached list of attorneys at the addresses set forth, 
this ^\(o day of -pf M , 1992, at LOGAN, UTAH. 
Sharon L. Hancey 
DISTRICT COURT CLERK 
BY: l JW -^
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I MAILED A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
ATTACHED NOTICE, BY FIRST CLASS MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID, 
TO THE FOLLOWING: 
NOLAN, PATRICK B. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
110 NORTH 100 WEST 
LOGAN UT 84321 
PETERSON, EDWIN T. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
P.O. BOX 57206 
MURRAY UT 84157 
DATED THISc^ M DAY OF £A 19. <5» 
1^±JGA<]^ 
Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM 2 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE WAGSTAFF, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No, 911000106 FS 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's motion to 
suppress after hearing on the 20th day of February, 1992 and the 
Court having entered its Memorandum Decision, IT IS NOW THEREFORE 
ORDERED that the Defendant's motion be and the same hereby is 
denied. '/" 
DATED this , -^~)0 day of February, 1992. 
y c 
-DISTRICT COURT-MUDGE-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above was 
mailed this date to Edwin T. Peterson, Attorney for Defendant, at 
P. O. Box 57206, Murray, Utah 84157. 
DATED this j ^ ° day of -Eeinftrary, 1992. 
,0.Sn*.cA QJL 
Legal Assistant t 
TILED 
MAR ,'J 1932 
ADDENDUM 3 
JAMES C. JENKINS 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
110 North 100 West 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-8920 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WADE WAGSTAFF, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
MISDEMEANOR'S OFFENSES 
Case No.: 911000106 FS 
Comes now the State of Utah by and through James C. Jenkins, 
Deputy Cache County Attorney, and in accordance with the 
representations made to the Court on the 20th day of February, 1992 
and the findings of the Court in Memorandum Decision of February 
26, 1992 now moves the Court to dismiss with prejudice Counts 2 and 
3 of the Amended Information (Misdemeanor charges) against the 
Defendant herein. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of March, 1992. 
puty uache County Attorney 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above was 
mailed this date to Edwin T. Peterson, Attorney for Defendant, at 
P. 0. Box 57206, Murray, Utah 84157. 
DATED this £>** day of March, 1992. 
Legal Assistant 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Sec. 11.56.610. Tampering with physical evidence, (a) A per-
son commits the crime of tampering with physical evidence if the 
person 
(1) destroys, mutilates, alters, suppresses, conceals, or removes 
physical evidence with intent to impair its verity or availability in an 
official proceeding or a criminal investigation; 
(2) makes, presents, or uses physical evidence, knowing it to be 
false, with intent to mislead a juror who is engaged in an official 
proceeding or a public servant who is engaged in an official proceeding 
or a criminal investigation; 
(3) prevents the production of physical evidence in an official pro-
ceeding or a criminal investigation by the use of force, threat, or 
deception against anyone; or 
(4) does any act described by (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection with 
intent to prevent the institution of an official proceeding. 
(b) Tampering with physical evidence is a class C felony. (§ 6 ch 
166 SLA 1978) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Defense attorney's holding evidence 
in inaccessible place. — While statutes 
which address the concealing of evidence 
are generally construed to require an af-
firmative act of concealment in addition to 
the failure to disclose information to the 
authorities, a defense attorney's taking 
possession of evidence from a nonclient 
third party and holding the evidence in a 
place not accessible to investigating au-
thorities would seem to fall within the 
statute's ambit. Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 
1200 (Alaska 1978). (Decided under for-
mer AS 11.30.315.) 
Analogy to AS 28.35.032(f). — This 
section was held to be sufficiently analo-
gous to AS 28.35.032(f), which makes re-
fusal to submit to a chemical test of 
breath authorized by AS 28.35.031 a class 
A misdemeanor, to protect AS 28.35.032(0 
from a due process challenge. Jensen v. 
State, 667 P.2d 188 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1983). 
Paragraph (aX4) simply provides al-
ternative mens rea for other three sub-
sections. Where only one act of tamper-
ing is alleged by the state, a defendant 
cannot be convicted of two counts merely 
because he may have simultaneously en-
tertained both of the alternative mental 
states. Williamson v. State, 692 P.2d 965 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984). 
Applied in State v. Huggins, 659 P.2d 
613 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Wil-
liams, 653 P.2d 1067 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1982). 
Conviction reversed where search 
warrant improperly issued. — See 
State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 
1985). 
Consecutive sentence vacated. — 
Trial court should not have imposed a 
five-year sentence for tampering with 
physical evidence consecutively to a 99-
year sentence for murder, where the 
record would not support the conclusion 
that defendant must be incarcerated for 
the remainder of his life without any pos-
sibility of parole. Thompson v. State, 768 
P.2d 127 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). 
Stated in Brown v. State, 739 P.2d 182 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in Jones v. State, 681 P.2d 364 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984). 
ADDENDUM 5 
investigation by a duly constituted prosecuting authority, law enforce-
ment agency, grand jury or legislative committee of this state is pending 
or is about to be instituted, shall: 
(a) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing 
with the purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(b) Make, present, or use any record, document, or thing, knowing it to 
be false. 
(2) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be 
guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.082, s. 775.083 or s. 775.084. 
Historical Note 
Derivation: 
Laws 1972, c. 72-315, § 2. 
Croat References 
Racketeering, see § 895.02. 
Tampering with witness, victim or informant, see § 914.22. 
Library References 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 2 
Construction with other laws 3 
Defenses 4 
Evidence 6 
Presumptions 6 
Sentence 7 
Validity 1 
1. Validity 
This section making it a crime to tamper 
with evidence is clear and concise enough 
for common understanding and is thus not 
unconstitutionally vague or overly broad. 
Smigiel v. State, App. 5 Dist, 489 So.2d 239 
(1983) review denied 447 So.2d 888. 
2. In general 
This section which proscribes impairing 
verity or availability of evidence in criminal 
trial or proceeding or investigation cannot 
be extended in application to persons, 
things, or acta not within its descriptive 
terms, that is, proscribed act or acta must 
be done with specified purpose. McNeil v. 
Stat*, App. 1 Dist., 438 So.2d 960 (1983). 
3. Construction with other laws 
Purpose of the Florida Security of Com-
munications Act was to protect victims of 
483 
illegal intercepts, not those who perpetrate 
them, and thus newspaper whose reporter 
made illegal intercepts lacked standing to 
assert, when charged with destruction of 
evidence, that the illegal tape recordings 
would have been inadmissible in evidence, 
and such circumstances would not preclude 
prosecution for destruction of evidence. 
State v. News-Press Pub. Co., App., 338 
So.2d 1313 (1976). 
4. Defenses 
Though mere fact that a person was fol-
lowing a standard policy would not neces-
sarily be a defense to a charge of destruc-
tion, of evidence, where newspaper reporter, 
after preparing her news stories, destroyed 
tape recordings of conversations with per-
son who had contacted her about a homi-
cide, pursuant to the standard business 
practice of the newspaper to erase tapes so 
that they could be reused, before the State 
had made any overtures to the reporter 
concerning its investigation of the murder, 
it could not be presumed that she had the 
purpose to destroy evidence, and in absence 
of any evidence pointing to an improper 
purpose in destroying the tapes, in order to 
impair their availability in the State's inves-
tigation, indictment charging destruction of 
Obstructing Justice «»6. 
CJ.S. Obstructing Justice or Governmen-
tal Administration §§ 3, 4, 18, 19. 
evidence was properly dismissed. State v. 
News-Press Pub. Co., App., 338 So.2d 1318 
(1976). 
6. Evidence 
Evidence, including magnetic tape eraser 
seized from defendant's law office, was le-
gally sufficient to support his conviction of 
tampering with evidence based upon era-
sure of tapes which incriminated defend-
ant's client Smigiel v. State, App. 6 Dist, 
439 So.2d 239 (1983) review denied 447 
So.2d888. 
In order to punish defendant for act asso-
ciated with constitutional right not to bear 
witness against himself, proof beyond rea-
sonable doubt was required that defendant 
harbored proscribed intent in tearing up 
waiver of rights form to impair its availabil-
ity was proof in criminal proceeding or in-
vestigation, and since all evidence as con-
sistent with reasonable hypothesis of inno-
cence, conviction for tampering with evi-
dence had to be reversed. McNeil v. State, 
App. 1 Dist, 438 So.2d 960 (1983). 
Jury in tampering with evidence prosecu-
tion could not properly have found beyond 
reasonable doubt that defendant's specific 
purpose in shredding waiver of rights form 
he had signed was to impair its availability 
as proof in criminal proceeding where it 
could not be assumed that defendant knew 
evidentiary value of document, and if de-
fendant had wanted to destroy evidence, he 
would have destroyed receipt which showed 
true ownership of tires he had allegedly 
The third-degree felony of tempering 
with evidence was not established where, 
aside from fact that State never explained 
the discrepancy between the $18,000 which 
allegedly represented the proceeds of a lar-
ceny and the $15,000 which the defendant 
admitted to having in his home, the State 
never proved that the $16,000 taken from 
the defendant's home was the proceeds of 
the larceny; it was uncontested that the 
money was deposited in a normal business 
fashion in an account with a nationally rec-
ognized brokerage house and, since it was 
not until after the money was deposited 
that police asked the defendant to turn it 
over, the State could not possibly show that 
the defendant concealed the money for the 
purpose of impairing its availability in a 
criminal trial. Rader v. State, App., 420 
So.2d 110 (1982). 
6. Presumptions 
Shredding of signed waiver of rights 
form by defendant under investigation did 
not of itself raise presumption that shred-
ding was done with purpose to impair verity 
or availability of form in criminal trial or 
proceeding or investigation. McNeil v. 
State, App. 1 Dist, 438 So.2d 960 (1983). 
7. Sentence 
Where defendant was charged and con-
victed of official misconduct and of tamper-
ing with physical evidence arising out of the 
same acts, but was given a single, general 
